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I. INTRODUCTION
A hospital should be able to deny a competitor physician medical staff privileges.
The hospital administration, governing body, and peer review committee are
qualified to determine whether a physician should be denied medical staff privileges.
These three entities are able to consider the qualifications of the physician, the need
for additional medical staff at the facility, and whether another staff member is in the
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hospital’s best “business” interest. The hospital administration oversees the
performance of the executive duties of a hospital.1 A governing body is the term that
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization [hereinafter
“JCAHO”] uses to describe who exerts the ultimate control and represents ownership
of the facility.2 The peer review committee consists of physicians on the medical
staff; it is an evaluation of a physician’s performance by other physicians, usually
within the same geographic region and medical specialty.3
Under Ohio Revised Code § 4731, a physician who is licensed may lawfully
practice medicine, thus, the professional license is a legal prerequisite to practice
medicine.4 Physicians are unable to build a successful practice without the ability to
exercise hospital staff privileges.5 Likewise, physicians are extremely important to a
hospital because without its medical staff, a hospital would not be able to care for its
patients.6 A physician without hospital staff privileges would find it difficult to
compete with those physicians who have been granted privileges and can offer
patients a wide variety of services.
Although a physician needs staff privileges in order to provide his services to
patients, a hospital cannot permit all physicians access to hospital facilities. The
hospital has a duty to review the credentials of all the physicians who desire staff
privileges and to allow privileges only to those deemed competent.7
Health care costs are continuing to rise. This forces hospitals to consider the cost
and efficiency of each physician when making privileging decisions. However,
hospitals cannot deny a competitor physician staff privileges strictly based on
economic factors.8 If this is the only consideration that the hospital utilizes, a denial
or restriction of privileges based solely on competitive considerations may expose
the hospital to liability under federal antitrust as well as state tort claims.9
This Note will focus primarily on Ohio laws and statutes. A comparison with
other jurisdictions also will be analyzed. This Note will illustrate the complexities
and ambiguities that exist regarding how a physician and hospital are associated with
each other. This Note attempts to accomplish the following: (1) discuss what
medical staff credentialing entails, (2) discuss what constitutes economic
1

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (6th ed. 1990).

2

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, Health Care Terms, at
<http://www.credentialinfo.com/cred/glossary.cfm> (stating the JCAHO’s term for the board
of directors, board of trustees, or the body that exterts ultimate control and represents
ownership of the facility).
3
Id. (stating peer review is the evaluation of a physician’s performance by other
physicians, usually within the same geographic and medical specialty).
4

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.341 (West 1998) (pertaining to doctors of medicine;
§ 4731.43 pertains to doctors of osteopathy).
5

MARCIA J. POLLARD & GRACE J. WIGAL, HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES WHAT EVERY
HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER AND LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 118 (1996).
6

SUSAN O. SCHEUTZOW, OHIO HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LAW 73 (1994).

7

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 118.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 2.
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credentialing, (3) analyze the current law regarding medical staff credentialing, (4)
analyze the current law regarding economic credentialing, and (5) propose a solution
to the current system regarding the vague “relationship” that exists between a
physician and a hospital. This solution would encourage hospitals to manage their
affairs similar to a business operation. There would be an employer/employee
relationship between a hospital and all physicians with medical staff privileges. This
Note will explain why a hospital should be able to deny a competitor physician
medical staff privileges.
II. DEFINING MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING IN OHIO
A. Ohio Hospitals
In order for a hospital to operate in Ohio, it must either be accredited by the
JCAHO, the American Osteopathic Association [hereinafter “AOA”], or certified by
Medicare.10 The JCAHO and AOA each require a hospital, that seeks accreditation,
to have a single organized medical staff.11 A hospital seeking certification from
Medicare, a federal payment program, must also have an organized medical staff.12
The JCAHO and AOA have detailed requirements as to what needs to be included in
the medical staff bylaws.13
The Ohio Revised Code provides that each hospital must have a mechanism for
determining who may obtain medical staff privileges.14 This is the only statutory
provision that Ohio has regarding who is eligible for medical staff privileges.
Therefore, each hospital individually determines the mechanisms that it will employ
regarding medical staff privileges. The statute requires the governing body of every
hospital to set standards and procedures in considering applications for staff
membership and staff privileges.15 For example, the governing body of a hospital
must consider the applicant’s respective state licensure in considering a physician for
its staff.16
B. Medical Staff Bylaws
Medical staff bylaws are legal documents that hospitals use as a means of
governance for the facility.17 Although the medical staff drafts policies and
procedures, the governing body assumes legal responsibility for the hospital and thus
is ultimately responsible for approving bylaws, policies, and procedures.18 The

10

SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 73-74.

11

Id. at 73 n.4.

12

42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (1999).

13

Id.

14

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(A)-(B) (West 1999).

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.

18

Id.
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bylaws create a framework within which the medical staff can act with a degree of
freedom in order to accomplish their tasks.19
A description of the medical staff’s organization is found in the hospital bylaws.
Each hospital has its own set of bylaws that the medical staff must follow. The
JCAHO provides in part that the hospital bylaws must define the method of selecting
officers for medical staff membership; the qualifications and responsibilities of
officers; the conditions and mechanisms for removing officers from their positions;
the requirements for frequency of meetings and for attendance; and a mechanism to
provide for effective communication among the medical staff, hospital
administration, and governing body.20
C. Medical Staff Membership
The medical staff is a group of physicians and other health care professionals
permitted by state law and a hospital to function as a group and manage different
aspects of the hospital’s business.21 The medical staff is one of the three components
of hospital governance, along with the governing body, and the hospital
administration. One responsibility of the medical staff under the hospital bylaws is
to review applications for medical staff membership and privileges.22 The medical
staff then makes its recommendations regarding the applicants to the governing body
that makes the final determinations.23
The medical staff is self-governing and is responsible for the for the quality of
the professional services provided by individuals with clinical privileges.24
Physicians at the hospital who have obtained medical staff privileges must adhere to
the medical bylaws, rules and regulations, and policies that are implemented as part
of the medical staff’s performance-improvement activities.25
D. Hospital Credentialing
The medical staff is largely responsible for the credentialing process. Physician
credentialing is the process of gathering relevant data regarding a physician’s
qualifications for membership to a particular medical staff.26 This data will serve as

19
JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 1996 ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, VOL. 1, STANDARDS (photo reprint 2000) [hereinafter “JOINT
COMM’N”].
20

Id.

21

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2 (defining medical staff-the
semi-autonomous group of physicians, other licensed independent practitioners, and other
such health care professionals permitted by state law and a hospital to take responsibility as a
group for specified aspects of hospital operation).
22

SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 73-74.

23

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.

24

See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 24.

25

Id.

26

American College of Emergency Physicians, Physician Credentialing and Delineation of
Clinical Privileges in Emergency Medicine, available at <http://www.acep.org/2,6350.html>.
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a factor in determining whether a physician is granted or denied staff privileges.27
The specific data that is evaluated is at the discretion of the institution. Credentialing
is usually a two-pronged process, which involves establishing requirements and
evaluating individual qualifications for entry into medical staff membership.28 First,
credentialing involves considering and establishing the professional training,
experience, and other requirements for medical staff membership.29 Second,
credentialing involves obtaining and evaluating evidence of the qualifications of
individual applicants.30
A hospital has specific mechanisms which it utilizes when deciding whether to
deny or grant a physician medical staff privileges. Based on medical staff
recommendations and the hospital bylaws, the governing body has the final decision
in staff privilege decisions.31 If a physician has been denied staff privileges and feels
that the decision was made in a discriminatory manner or was an adverse decision he
is entitled to a fair hearing and an appeal process.32 Decisions to deny a physician
medical staff privileges must consider criteria that is directly related to the quality of
patient care.33
A physician who desires membership at a hospital fills out an application for the
medical staff; the physician is then given a written copy of the hospital bylaws, rules
and regulations, and policies.34 The applicant then signs an agreement, if granted
medical staff privileges, the physician will be bound to the bylaws, rules and
regulations, and policies.35 In the hospital bylaws, there is a section that indicates the
criteria that the medical staff and hospital board will evaluate.36 The hospital then
verifies this information from the primary sources.37
The credentialing process includes information regarding a suspended or pending
suspension of the applicant’s license.38 It also inquires as to whether the applicant
was denied or had privileges revoked at another organization.39 Applicants consent

27

Id.

28

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.

29

Id. (stating that credentialing involves considering and establishing the professional
training, experience, and other requirements for medical staff membership).
30
Id. (stating that credentialing involves obtaining and evaluating evidence of the
qualifications of individual applicants).
31

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(B) (1999).

32

See infra Section IV.B.

33

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 9.

34

See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 29.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 30.

39

See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 31.
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to the hospital verifying any of the information that they have disclosed.40 The
credentialing is made for a period of not more than two years.41
The applicant applies for privileges for which he has documented experience in
performing.42 Clinical privileging determines the minimum training and experience
necessary for a clinician to competently carry out a particular procedure.43 It also
entails whether the credentials of the applicant meet the requirements of the hospital
and its bylaws.44 Finally, privileging allows authorization to carry out the procedures
that a physician has requested.45 According to JCAHO’s 1998 Comprehensive
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, each hospital should have professional criteria
as the basis for granting initial or reviewed/revised clinical privileges.46 These
criteria must pertain to, at the very least, evidence of current license, relevant
training and/or experience, current competency, and health status.47
III. ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
A. Defined
Economic credentialing is a term used when a hospital makes a decision
regarding an individual for medical staff membership based upon the impact that a
physician has economically on the hospital.48 The term is aimed at making a
physician aware of how he is using the hospital’s resources.49 For example, assume
that Dr. X has one hundred patients for whom his diagnostic tests and treatment costs
are $2000. Assume Dr. Y also has one hundred patients and that Dr. Y’s prescribed
diagnostic tests and treatment costs are $3000. Dr. X has a cost ratio of twenty to
one. Dr. Y has a cost ratio of thirty to one. In certain managed-care plans such as
Health Maintenance Organizations [hereinafter “HMOs”] with prepaid premiums,

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 33.

43

Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.

44

Id.

45

Id. (stating that privileging is the three-pronged process of determining which diagnostic
and treatment procedures a hospital is equipped and staffed to support, the minimum training
and experience necessary for a clinician to competently carry out each procedure, and whether
the credentials of applicants meet requirements and allow authorization to carry out requested
procedures).
46
Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, Approach Our Credentialing, at
<http://www.credentialinfo.com/cred/fundamentals/credapproach.cfm>
(stating,
that
according to the JCAHO’s 1998 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, each
hospital should have professional criteria as the basis for granting initial or renewed/revised
clinical privileges; these criteria pertain to, at the very least, evidence of current licensure,
relevant training and/or experience, current competency, and health status).
47

Id.

48

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 117.

49

Id.
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Dr. X has preferable “economic credentials” as compared with Dr. Y. In order for
the managed care company to make a profit, it would be prudent to have Dr. X on
staff as opposed to Dr. Y.50 This data is kept and used to grant membership to
physicians in hospitals, HMOs, or Independent Practice Associations [hereinafter
“IPAs”].51
When a hospital’s economic considerations are related to the quality of patient
care or physician competency, they are not viewed as “pure” economic
considerations.52 For example, a physician’s economic credentials can be compared
with other physicians’ economic credentials within the same hospital and other
physicians caring for patients within the same specialty. Quality of care is
implicated when the physician’s patients’ length of stay in the hospital for a
particular diagnosis is compared to the hospital average.53 Quality of care is also
implicated where the hospital compares the individual physician’s charges with the
hospital average in the same Diagnosis-Related Group [hereinafter “DRG”], and
analyzes the physician’s hospital utilization rate.54 Some hospitals have begun to use
such economic criteria in reviewing physician activity and making their privilege
decisions,55and courts have upheld such criteria as valid.56
B. Prospective Payment System
In today’s increasingly competitive medical market, hospitals may legitimately
choose to limit the number of physicians with staff privileges for economic reasons.57
Legitimate reasons include administrative and quality control costs, as well as the
need to establish and maintain the hospitals reputation as a quality provider.58
Hospitals generally operate under a system of prospective reimbursement from
payors such as Medicare and Medicaid, therefore, a physician’s ability to control
costs is critical. One commentator has stated that between seventy to ninety percent

50
Robert Weinmann, Medical Red-lining: Economic Credentials For Physicians, S.F.
EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 1996, at A19.
51

Id.

52

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 8.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 105.

55
Anita J. Slomski, Hospitals Wield a Heavy Club Against High-Cost Doctors, MED.
ECON., Oct. 7, 1991, at 57.
56

See, e.g., Maltz v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 503 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1986) (holding that
the hospital is entitled to deny applications for privileges based on hospital bed limitation and
adequate staffing in physician’s are of specialization); Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc.,
568 N.E.2d 1181 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that utilization of the hospital can be
considered in making privilege decisions).
57
Deborah Casey, Austin v. McNamara and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act:
From Speculation to Implementation, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 389 (1990) (discussing of the
importance of hospital reputation in the marketplace).
58

Id.
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of health care expenditures are within the control of physicians.59 Because of this,
hospitals are forced to consider a physician’s economic impact on the hospital.
Under a prospective payment system, a hospital is paid a fixed amount per
patient based on the patient’s diagnosis, regardless of actual treatment costs.60 The
system is based on DRGs, which are used to establish a schedule of fixed treatment
costs.61 Thus, the DRG schedule limits the amount that the hospital may bill
Medicare for each diagnosed patient illness.
The DRG reimbursement system is “prospective” because the cost of treatment is
determined before, rather than after treatment.62 This reimbursement scheme creates
a “risk-based incentive for hospitals to economize.”63 Thus, the only way a hospital
can substantially increase its operating revenue is to monitor the amount of tests and
treatment costs that physicians incur.
Under the prospective payment system a physician may “cost” the hospital a
substantial amount of money. For example, consider a patient admitted to the
hospital with a diagnosis of a myocardial infarction. The hospital has agreed to
accept a certain amount of money for the diagnosis. If the average length of stay
without any complications for this diagnosis is three days and the patient remains in
the hospital for one week the hospital will be unable to generate revenue. The same
is true of the physician who orders excessive amounts of tests while the patient is
hospitalized. Therefore, a hospital can successfully increase its operating revenue by
examining a physician’s economic credentials.
C. Hospital Bylaws
If a hospital decides to examine economic criteria in determining whether to
grant or deny a physician staff privileges, it must state in its bylaws how the
economic criteria will be examined or utilized.64 For example, attorney Jack
Schroder, Jr. advises hospitals to include a bylaw that notifies physicians that they
must:
[w]ork cooperatively with the quality assurance committee, the utilization
review committee, the executive committee and administration to meet
and practice within the guidelines established by the hospital, its medical
59

Katherine Beseech, Hot Topics in Medical Staff Credentialing: Economic Credentialing
and HIV-Affected Practitioners, 42 HEALTH 128 (1993).
60
The federal government adopted a prospective payment system for Medicare hospital
patients in 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 ww(d) (1988).
61
Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 436 (1988). The system is based on DRGs, which
are used to establish a schedule of fixed treatment costs. Id. The DRG schedule caps the costs
that hospitals may bill Medicare for each diagnosed patient illness. Id. The DRG
reimbursement system is “prospective” because the cost of treatment is determined before,
rather than after treatment. Id. Obviously, this reimbursement scheme creates a “risk-based
incentive for hospitals to economize.” Id.
62

Hall, supra note 61, at 436.

63

Id.

64

Jack Schroder, Jr., Critical Revisions in Medical Staff Bylaws, American Bar Assoc.
Forum on Health Law Presentation (Spring 1994).
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staff or the local Professional Review Organization, to minimize or
eliminate disallowed admissions, to eliminate technical diagnosis entry
and coding errors, to order or utilize supporting ancillary services only
when necessary, and to shorten length of stay at the hospital where
medically appropriate.65
Schroder states that this criteria should be included in the hospital bylaws
because the bylaws use objective language.66 The objective language of the bylaws
assures that all physicians are reviewed objectively by the hospital.67 Furthermore,
because the criteria examined under the bylaws address quality of care concerns as
well as economic issues, the bylaw requirement cannot be viewed as a “pure”
economic consideration.68
IV. MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING AND THE LAW
A. Discretion by the Courts
The courts have consistently stated that the main purpose of a hospital is to serve
the public.69 Courts have confirmed that a hospital, in making staff decisions, must
consider the needs of the patients.70 Hospital powers must be exercised reasonably
for the public good and must genuinely serve public health objectives.71 The hospital
board is given broad discretionary powers in managing their affairs, including the
selection of medical staff.72
Each state, along with the federal regulations, has statutes regarding hospital staff
and professional privileges. The Code of Federal Regulations states in part that a
“hospital must have an organized medical staff that operates under bylaws approved
by the governing body and is responsible for the quality of medical care provided to
patients by the hospital.”73 Under Ohio Revised Code § 3701.351, hospitals “shall
set standards and procedures to be applied to the hospital and its medical staff in
considering and acting upon applications for staff membership or professional
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

CAROLINE R. WILSON & ANNE M. DELLINGER, STAFF MEMBERSHIP AND CLINICAL
PRIVILEGES IN HEALTH CARE FACILITIES LAW: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS, HMOS, AND
EXTENDED CARE FACILITIES 18 (1991) (stating that hospital administrators who amend the
bylaws to include economic criteria as a valid factor for denying or terminating staff privileges
should consider that the JCAHO standards support a hospital’s right to enforce its interest in
efficiency by requiring physicians to abide by hospital bylaws, policies, and regulations; the
states of Indiana and Colorado have enacted statutes that recognize the hospital’s interest in
efficient operation).
68

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 104.

69

Belmar v. Cipolla, 475 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1984).

70

Desai v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 666 (N.J. 1986).

71

Id. at 668.

72

Sokol v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 173 F.3d 1026, 1032 (6th Cir. 1999).

73

42 C.F.R. § 428.22.
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privileges.”74
Courts do not interfere with a reasonable management decision
concerning staff privileges as long as that decision strengthens the health care
mission of the hospital.75
A hospital may deny a physician medical staff privileges, but must not violate
Ohio Revised Code § 3701.351.76 Under this Statute, hospitals are prohibited from
adopting standards for staff membership or clinical privileges that are not reasonably
related to accepted measures of skill, education, and competence.77 Ohio Revised
Code § 3701.351(B) prevents a hospital from discriminating against qualified
persons who are certified to practice medicine, osteopathic medicine, podiatry,
dentistry, or psychology.78 In Dooley v. Barbarton Citizens’ Hospital, the plaintiff
prevailed when the hospital discriminated against him for being a podiatrist.79 The
court held that the qualifications placed on a podiatrist for staff privileges were not
reasonably related to a determination of whether or not a podiatrist was qualified.80
Thus, the court held that the hospital violated § 3701.351.81
In granting a physician staff privileges, the hospital must consider the need for
and impact of additional doctors on the existing hospital’s staff.82 Hospitals must
balance the interests of its management with those of a doctor who desires to practice
at a particular hospital.83 Hospital officials are properly vested with large measures
of managing discretion, and to the extent that they exert their efforts towards the
maintaining of hospital standards and higher medical care, they will receive broad
judicial support.84
In Sosa v. Board of Managers, the physician alleged the hospital violated his
constitutional rights by denying him medical staff privileges.85 The Fifth Circuit
held that although the physician satisfactorily met all of the requirements for staff
privileges on paper, it was not unconstitutional for the hospital to deny him staff
privileges.86 The court also noted that the hospital board may choose to exact
additional standards reasonably related to the operation of the hospital.87
74

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(A) (West 1999).

75

Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963).

76

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351 (West 1999).

77

Dooley v. Barberton Citizens’ Hosp., 465 N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 1984).

78

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(B) (West 1999).

79

465 N.E.2d at 61.

80

Id. at 63.

81

Id. at 58.

82

Belmar, 475 A.2d at 538.

83

Id. at 539.

84

Id. at 538.

85

Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir.
1971).
86

Id. at 176.

87

Id.
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A refusal must be based on “any reasonable basis, such as professional or ethical
qualifications of the physicians or the common good of the public and the
Hospital….”88 The hospital must be given great latitude in prescribing the necessary
qualifications for potential applicants.89 A hospital board is given broad discretion in
screening applicants, but it must only refuse applicants for those matters which are
reasonably related to the operation of the hospital.90 Consequently, a hospital may
deny a qualified applicant staff privileges and not fear legal proceedings.
B. Due Process
The JCAHO can require a hospital to include certain provisions in its bylaws.91
When a physician is denied medical staff privileges, the bylaws state that
mechanisms exist, including a fair hearing and appeal process if the physician feels
he has been adversely denied.92 The Supreme Court of Ohio held that medical staff
members must exhaust all administrative remedies provided in the hospital bylaws,
policies, and rules or regulations prior to bringing an action to the court.93 Generally,
courts accept these proceedings and do not substitute their judgments for that of the
hospital’s judgment regarding the denial of a physician’s staff privileges.94
C. Antitrust
When a hospital denies a physician staff privileges, it may face an antitrust
challenge, because a hospital’s acts are subject to scrutiny under Sections One and
Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.95 If the hospital violates the Sherman Antitrust
Act, it faces civil damages, injunctions, and a possibility of criminal action.96
Antitrust statutes were enacted to protect unfair competition.97 Section One of
the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or foreign nations…” and declares such contracts to be illegal.98 The four
elements that must be satisfied in order for an antitrust violation to arise are: (1) a
contract, combination, or a conspiracy; (2) a substantial impact on interstate

88

Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1968).

89

Id.

90

Sosa, 437 F.2d at 176-77.

91

SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 64.

92

JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 36.

93

Nemazee v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 564 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1990).

94

Khan v. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 340 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio 1976); Klinge v. Lutheran
Charities Ass’n, 383 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Duffield v. Memorial Hosp. Ass’n., 361
F. Supp. 398 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Dillard v. Rowland, 520 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 232 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
95

15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999).

96

§§ 1, 2, 4, 15(a), 26.

97

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (Pocket ed. 1996).

98

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
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commerce; (3) an anticompetitive purpose or effect; and (4) an effect on relevant
services and markets.99
1. A Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy
In satisfying element number one, courts need to determine if a contract was
formed between the parties.100 Whether a contract exists between a hospital and its
physicians pertaining to the staff bylaws remains uncertain. Some states, such as
Alabama and Indiana, hold that hospital bylaws constitute a legally binding contract
because if the bylaws do not legally bind the physician and hospital, in essence, they
are meaningless.101
In Ohio, the general rule that courts tend to follow is that the bylaws do not form
a per se contract. In Munoz v. Flowers, the court stated that each set of bylaws
should be examined to determine if the parties intended to form a contract. 102 In this
case, the court held that the hospital never intended to be bound by its bylaws
because the preamble stated that the bylaws were “subject to the ultimate authority of
the applicable governing bodies.”103
Courts have not ruled definitively on whether a contract is formed between a
physician and hospital regarding the bylaws. Hospitals can argue that the bylaws are
not a legally binding entity. There is no consideration between the hospital and the
physician therefore, no contract exists.104 Consideration is a basic, necessary element
for the existence of a valid contract that is legally binding on the parties.105 It
consists of some right or inducement by one party while the other party suffers a
detriment or loss.106 Courts are reluctant to find consideration between a physician
and a hospital regarding the bylaws. 107
Case law has held that a conspiracy does not usually exist between a hospital and
the medical staff. The hospital’s governing body, hospital administration, and the
medical staff (in the form of a peer review)108 convene to determine acceptance or
denial of medical staff privileges.109
99
See e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that the
phrase “restraint of trade” in the Sherman Act refers not to a particular list of agreements, but
to a particular economic consequence that may be produced by quite different sorts of
agreements in varying times and circumstances).
100

15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999).

101
Clemons v. Fairview Med. Ctr. Inc., 449 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 1984); Terre Haute Reg’l
Hosp. Inc. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
102

Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 364-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).

103

Id. at 365.

104

Natale v. Sisters of Mercy of Council Bluffs, 52 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1952).

105

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 308 (6th ed. 1990).

106

Id.

107

Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n, 182 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 1963).

108

Swatch v. Treat, 671 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that peer review
is a process intended to encourage the rigorous and candid evaluation of a physician’s
professional performance by his peers); Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the
Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 419, 423 (1993) (noting that
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A peer review committee can be attacked as not being an objective system to
evaluate physicians. It may be argued that one must always consider the possibility
of a conspiracy against a competing physician regarding obtaining medical staff
privileges. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., holding that an intracorporate agreement cannot
constitute a conspiracy.110 Because a peer review decision is usually based on the
medical staff’s recommendation, and the decision is ultimately made by the
hospital’s governing body, intracorporate immunity would likely apply.111 In other
words, a hospital staff cannot be held liable for a conspiracy with the governing body
within the meaning of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act.112
A conspiracy was not found in Todorov v. DCH Healthcare, where a physician
was denied additional staff privileges at a hospital.113 The facts of the case did not
exclude the possibility that the hospital acted unilaterally and procompetitively.114
The court stated that the hospital may act to foster competition and to serve its own
economic interest without constituting a conspiracy.115
In Willman v. Heartland Hospital East, the Court goes as far as stating that even
if a hospital can conspire with its medical staff—although it does not concede this
point—revocation or denial of medical staff privileges does not violate antitrust
laws.116 Even if a court finds that a conspiracy has been found, a hospital can defend
itself by showing that it acted for an independent reason. Promoting quality medical
the physicians on the committee become peer evaluators for the hospital while remaining an
individual provider of health care services for the hospital, maintaining direct and indirect
competition with those individuals he will review); Jacqueline Oliverio, Hospital Liability for
Defamation of Character During the Peer Review Process: Sticks and Stones May Break My
Bones, But Words May Cost Me, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 739 (1990) (asserting that the peer review
process is based on the theory of self-regulation in that hospital physicians are asked to review
and evaluate the performance of their co-workers and to restrict or deny hospital privileges if
necessary).
109

Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). A conspiracy was not
found in this Fifth Circuit case between a hospital and hospital administrator because the
parties stood in an agency relationship. Id.
110
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Cooper v.
Forsyth County Hosp. Auth. Inc., 479 U.S. 972 (1986) (recognizing that making a peer review
recommendation does not prove the existence of a conspiracy); Oksanen v. Page Mem’l
Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 1991) (commenting that where a peer review procedure is
used, a conspiracy is hard to prove if the review committee has no power to make the final
decision).
111
See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 776 (holding that (1) officers or employees of the
same firm do not provide the same plurality of actors imperative of Section One of the
Sherman Act conspiracy, and (2) a corporation does not violate Section One of the Sherman
Act by agreeing to pursue a course of action with a wholly-owned subsidiary).
112

Id.

113

Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456-57 (11th Cir. 1991).

114

Id. at 1456.

115

Id. at 1457.

116

Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 514 U.S. 1018 (1995).
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care is a defense that hospitals can use in order to justify the reason a physician was
denied staff privileges.117
2. A Substantial Impact on Interstate Commerce
A physician must try to show that a substantial impact on interstate commerce
has occurred in order to satisfy the second element of the Sherman Act.118 Before
1991, physicians had a difficult time bringing cases into federal court because they
could not show the nexus between being denied medical staff privileges and
interstate commerce.119 Federal courts often dismissed the action because physicians
were unable to show that the conspiracy which excluded them significantly impacted
interstate commerce. In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, the Court rejected the
hospital’s claim that by denying a physician staff privileges there was no impact on
interstate commerce.120 This made it easier for physicians to meet the second
element, which shows a substantial impact on interstate commerce and thus bring
claims into the federal court system.
3. An Anticompetitive Purpose or Effect
Next, a physician needs to establish the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the
hospital’s conduct.121 In other words, to prove injury actionable under the antitrust
laws, the physician must show an injury to competition, not just to themselves as
competitors.122
A successful antitrust plaintiff must prove both injury to himself and to
competition in the market.123 The Court in Summit Health stated that the purpose of
a federal antitrust law is “[t]he essence of any § 1 violation is the illegal agreement
itself, [so] the proper analysis focuses upon the potential harm that would ensue if
the conspiracy were successful, not upon actual consequences.”124 A physician who
is excluded from the market is measured not by a particularized evaluation of the
physician’s practice but by a general evaluation of the restraint’s impact on other
physicians practicing in the area and particular specialty.125
The United States Supreme Court has held that no anticompetitive purpose was
found where a physician was denied staff privileges.126 Although the hospital
utilized exclusive contracts with its anesthesiologists, this was legal and did not
foster an anticompetitive purpose among other anesthesiologists.127 In Jefferson
117

Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 640 (3d Cir. 1996).

118

Id.

119

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 105.

120

500 U.S. 322 (1991).

121

Id.

122

Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982).

123

Boczar v. Manatee Hosp. & Health Sys. Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (M.D. Fl. 1990).

124

500 U.S. at 322.

125

Id. at 323.

126

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

127

Id. at 8.
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Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Supreme Court stated if the exclusive
contract foreclosed so much of the market as to reasonably restrain competition, the
contract would then be unlawful.128 The Court discussed whether it was necessary to
determine if the exclusive contract had an adverse effect on competition among
anesthesiologists.129 The Court denied this claim and reasoned that the exclusive
contract simply shifted the focus of competition among anesthesiologists.130
4. An Effect on Relevant Services and Markets
In order to satisfy the final element, a physician who was denied staff privileges
from a competitor hospital must claim that the denial of staff privileges limits his
ability to serve patients in the relevant market.131
Establishing a relevant market entails analyzing the geographic areas from which
hospitals draw their patients.132 This approach relies on patient inflow and
outmigration statistics.133 The patient inflow statistic measures the percentage of
patients from outside a particular area who come to the hospital within the area.134
The patient outmigration statistic measures the percentage of patients from a
particular area that uses hospital services outside the area.135 If both the inflow and
the outmigration statistics are low, the particular geographic area is probably the
relevant market.136
In Robinson v. Magovun,137 a thoracic surgeon was denied staff privileges at
Allegheny General Hospital. The Court held that the physician’s denial of staff
privileges was lawful because it was based on the hospital’s plan for quality control
and fair competition.138 Dr. Robinson was a board-certified thoracic surgeon who
was seeking hospital privileges.139 In Pittsburgh there were six hospitals which
provided open heart surgery services.140 After being denied privileges, Dr. Robinson
brought an antitrust violation against the hospital alleging violations of Sections One
and Two of the Sherman Act.141 The hospital reasoned that the denial of Dr.
128

Id.

129

Id. at 3.

130

Id. at 31.

131

15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999).

132

Roger D. Blair & James M. Fesmire, Antitrust Treatment of Hospital Mergers, 2 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 49 (1988-89).
133

Id.

134

See id. at 45-50.

135

Id. at 52.

136

Id.

137

688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982).

138

Id. at 846.

139

Id. at 827

140

Id. at 828.

141

Id. at 859.
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Robinson’s staff privileges was made after it had determined that its addition to its
medical staff would be inconsistent with the hospital’s institutional objectives.142
In conclusion, if a physician can prove all of the above four elements then the
hospital may be liable for civil, as well as criminal penalties, when a hospital denies
a physician staff privileges. A physician could show that his denial of staff
privileges had an effect on interstate commerce. A physician can often easily prove
that his denial had an effect on the relative market. Recent case law affirms all of
these points.143 Difficulty arises when the physician tries to prove a contract or a
conspiracy. If this element can be shown the physician then has to prove the hospital
had an anticompetitive purpose for denying staff privileges. A hospital’s defense to
denying a physician staff privileges is that it was promoting quality medical care.144
Courts give broad discretion to a hospital board in managing their affairs, including
the selection of medical staff.145
D. Essential Facility Doctrine
The essential facility doctrine is a relatively new theory that utilizes both the law
of monopolization and the refusal to deal.146 The theory began to be utilized in the
1980’s when plaintiffs began invoking the doctrine as a supplement theory of
antitrust law in two situations, monopolization and refusal to deal.147
First, the law of monopolization involves a competitor who desires to gain access
or use some “essential” facility.148 The claim is that competitor can not compete
effectively or enter into the marketplace without access to the essential facility.149
Second, a refusal to deal involves a group of firms which produce or control a
facility to which a competitor desires access.150 The claim is that a group has refused

142

See Robinson, 688 F.2d at 826 (arguing that his exclusion from the medical staff
restrained trade by restricting his ability to practice medicine). Plaintiff also claimed that the
hospital had an unlawful purpose or an unreasonable anticompetitive effect, thus violating
Section One of the Sherman Act. Id. at 828. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Dr. Robinson failed to establish
that the hospital and certain surgeons on the hospital’s staff unreasonably restrained trade. Id.
When evaluating Dr. Robinson’s application for staff privileges, the hospital noted his ability
to provide continuous care to patients, his ability to contribute to the cardiothoracic residency
program, and to work in harmony with fellow surgeons. Id. at 829. The Court ruled that these
criteria were reasonably related to the hospital’s legitimate institutional objectives. Id.
143

See supra Section IV. C.

144

Mathews, 87 F.3d at 644.

145

Sokol, 173 F.3d at 1026.

146

Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST 841 (1990).
147
Scott D. Makar, The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry, 21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (1994).
148

MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).

149

Makar, supra note 147, at 915.

150

Century Air Freight, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1984).
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to deal with the competitor and has thereby unreasonably denied him the “essential”
resource.151
The essential facility doctrine requires the owner of the facility or governing
body to provide its business rivals with the use or access to the facility on fair
terms.152 The term has been successfully used in discussing railroads, electric
utilities, and natural gas industries.153 Recently, physicians have attempted to apply
the term to instances where medical staff privileges have been denied.
Physicians have endeavored to use the theory in cases involving a physician
attempting to gain access to a competitor hospital; the physician in this case claims
that he cannot compete effectively in his profession without receiving admitting
privileges from the facility.154 Physicians often claim that the hospital is
“monopolizing” the market.155 It is argued that the competitor hospital is willingly
attempting to monopolize its services in a particular geographical area.156
A unilateral refusal by a hospital against a physician usually is legal.157 The
current law generally allows facilities the freedom to deal or to refuse to deal with
whomever they choose, unless the refusal supports an illegal restraint or constitutes
illegal monopolization.158 Even if a facility is deemed to be a monopolist, it has no
general duty to cooperate with competitors.159
In order for a physician to be successful in his claim, it must be shown that a
hospital is an “essential” facility.160 Health care facilities are not “essential” in an
antitrust sense.161 Although arguably, health care services are “essential” to an
individual’s well-being.162 Courts usually reject claims that hospitals are “essential”

151

Makar, supra note 147, at 915.

152

Id. at 913.

153

William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the
Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L. J. 337 (1987).
154

Makar, supra note 147, at 915.

155

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (stating that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize” shall be
guilty of a felony).
156

Makar, supra note 147, at 915 (stating monopoly is not illegal under the antitrust laws;
it is only illegal if the hospital uses illegitimate business practices to achieve or maintain
monopoly power); United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (holding monopoly power
alone is not sufficient to establish a monopolization claim; there must also be anticompetitive
conduct evidencing a general intent to monopolize-willful maintenance or acquisition).
157

Makar, supra note 147, at 916.

158

Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 52 ANTITRUST 344 (1978).

159

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-01 (1985).

160

MCI Communications Corp., 708 F.2d at 1081.

161

Makar, supra note 147, at 927.

162

Id.
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facilities.163 Because physicians have a difficult time proving this element, claims
against a hospital as violating the essential facility doctrine are likely to fail.164
Little coherent judicial guidance exists as to what “essential” means.165 Courts
have yet to define the terms “essential facility” or a “monopolized facility.”166 A few
courts have stated that to be essential “it is sufficient if duplication of the facility
would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap
on potential market entrants.”167 Some courts have determined what essential is: a
facility is not essential merely because it is better than or preferable to another.168
Facilities that competitors can “practicably” or “reasonably” duplicate are not
essential.169 The lack of objectiveness provides courts with discretion in their
interpretation and application of the term “essential facility.”
Physicians may try to claim that staff privileges are essential facilities. The claim
is that the physician is unable to compete without privileges that permit access to the
facility. A number of courts have rejected this claim and have held that the staff
privilege relationship between a physician and a hospital is unique and not subject to
significant antitrust scrutiny.170 In Pontius v. Children’s Hospital,171 the plaintiffphysician alleged that the hospital conspired in violation of the antitrust laws not to
retain him on the hospital’s staff. The physician asserted a per se essential facility
claim.172 The court held that the essential facility doctrine is inapplicable to hospital
staff privileges decisions.173 The court’s decision appears to be based entirely on its

163

See Advanced Health-Care Servs. Inc., v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir.
1990); Key Enters. v. Venice Hosp., 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993).
164
Makar, supra note 147, at 927 (stating that courts are reluctant to grant antitrust claims
to physicians where there is evidence that although the physician was denied staff privileges
from one hospital a substantial income was made by the physician from another facility; courts
reason that the facility is not essential if economic rivals continue to prosper even though staff
privileges were denied).
165

Id. at 922.

166

Id.

167

See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986); Hecht v. ProFootball Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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See, e.g., Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539.

169

See, e.g., Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992.

170

See Tarabishi v. Northern Mich. Hosp. Inc., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing cases
that have declared the essential facility doctrine inapplicable to staff privilege cases for public
policy reasons); Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 995-96 (N.D. Ga.
1992) (stating access to hospital is necessary for practice of obstetrics but “inappropriate” to
apply the essential facility doctrine that would prevent hospital from keeping unqualified
doctors off its staff).
171

552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).

172

Id. at 1354.

173

Id. at 1370 (“Even if we accept, without any evidence having been put forward, the
proposition that [the hospital’s] thoracic and cardiovascular surgical facilities may not
practically be duplicated, we believe that it would be singularly inappropriate to apply a
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concern that mandatory access under a per se essential facility test could prevent a
hospital from denying medical staff privileges to an unqualified applicant.174
In Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center,175 the court concluded that the essential
facility doctrine does not apply to “exclusive service contracts by hospitals.” The
court stated that “if there were a case in which the hospital would be an essential
facility, [the defendant] would not be that hospital.176 Within a forty mile radius of
[the defendant-hospital], there are eight other hospitals at which Castelli could
potentially practice.”177 The court ultimately concluded that the presence of a
significant number of competing facilities negated the essential facility claim
presented.178
As shown in this section, physicians are generally unsuccessful in alleged
violations of the essential facility doctrine. Courts continue to follow the trend that
the hospital is given broad discretion in making decisions regarding staff privileges.
E. Closed Staff Policy
A hospital may restrict admission to the medical staff on a limited basis. An
example is a hospital regulating staff privileges to only physicians practicing a
certain specialty; this is often referred to as a “closed staff policy.”179 If additional
physicians on staff would cause over-utilization of the hospital’s limited resources,
this would justify refusing a qualified physician to hospital staff.180 Under Ohio law,
hospitals are given broad discretion in determining who will obtain medical staff
privileges.181
A New Jersey court held that closing the medical staff was legal; however,
instances where exceptions were made to permit physicians to join the staff if they
were joining the practices of other physicians on staff, was not legal and was found
to be discriminatory.182 It is permissible to have a closed staff as long as it is done in
a nondiscriminatory and reasonable manner.183
Hospitals instituting a closed staff policy can do so without fearing legal
proceedings. Case law defends the practice where the exclusion of the physicians

doctrine which would prevent a hospital from keeping doctors it had adjudged unqualified off
of its staff. Neither the public policy nor the Sherman Act can countenance such a result.”).
174

Makar, supra note 147, at 939.
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702 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see also infra Section IV. F.
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Id. at 1205.
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Id. at 1209.
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Id. at 1211.
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SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 83.
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Desai, 510 A.2d at 669.
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Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177.
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Desai, 510 A.2d at 672.

183

Id.
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was done as not to affect the quality of patient care and where the decision furthers
the health care mission of the hospital.184
F. Exclusive Contracts
In Ohio, exclusive contracts for services of provider-based physicians are a valid
and enforceable means of providing medical services in a hospital.185 An exclusive
contract is more prevalent regarding hospital contracts with provider-based physician
groups, such as radiologists, pathologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency room
physicians whereby the physician group is given the exclusive control to provide
medical services in that specialty.186
Courts have held that exclusive contracts did not violate public policy and were a
reasonable choice by the hospital.187 The primary purpose of a hospital is to serve
the public, regardless of the arrangement between physician and hospital.188 Courts
do not normally interfere with a reasonable management decision concerning staff
privileges as long as that decision furthers the health care mission of the hospital.189
In 1984, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.190 In July 1977, Dr. Hyde, the defendant, applied for
anesthesia privileges at the hospital.191 The medical staff recommended that Dr.
Hyde be granted privileges to the hospital.192 Despite the recommendation, the
hospital governing board denied the application because of the exclusive contract the
hospital had with Roux & Associates.193
The Court held that the exclusive contract between the anesthesiology group and
the hospital was valid and enforceable.194 The Court noted, that like any contract,
this contract would have been unlawful if it foreclosed so much of the market as to
unreasonably restrain competition.195

184

Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495 (N.J. 1974); Falcone v.
Middlesex County Med. Soc’y., 170 A.2d 791 (N.J. 1961); Desai, 510 A.2d at 672.
185

SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 103-04.

186

Id.
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Belmar, 475 A.2d at 539-40.

188

Id. at 538.
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Greisman, 192 A.2d at 825.
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466 U.S. at 2. The hospital exclusively contracted with the Roux & Associates, a group
of anesthesiologists. Id. The group agreed to provide twenty-four hour staffing, not to work
elsewhere, to supervise the nurse anesthetists, and to perform all needed anesthesia services
for the hospital. Id. In return for Roux & Associates’ services, a five-year contract as the
exclusive provider of anesthesia services at Jefferson Parish Hospital was established. Id.
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Id. at 3.
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Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 3.
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Id. at 5.

194

Id. at 3.

195

Id. at 31.

2000-01]

DENYING MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES

267

Exclusive contracts dealing with provider-based physician groups are
permissible.196 Their specialty areas differ from surgeons, general practitioners, or
other physicians who admit to hospitals. Provider-based physician groups generally
do not admit patients to hospitals, and are not responsible for overseeing the patient’s
care while hospitalized.197 Provider-based physicians usually rely on consultations
from other physicians for business.198 When a physician’s business relies primarily
on consults problems often ensue. Physicians who admit patients to hospitals may
exert unreasonable demands on the provider-based physicians.199
For example, without exclusive contracts in an open system, a provider-based
physician, like an anesthesiologist, may be called in by a surgeon on his day off.200
The anesthesiologist at home, knowing he needs consults from surgeons, may come
into the hospital even though there was adequate anesthesia coverage at the time in
the hospital.201 The anesthesiologist may fear not receiving consults from a
particular surgeon if he does not meet the surgeons expectations.202
The surgeon may favor one anesthesiologist over the others and may stop
consulting him if he does not come in on his day off, rearrange his schedule to meet
the needs of the surgeon, or care for the surgeon’s patients in the manner that the
surgeon prefers.203 This would negatively affect the anesthesiologist’s practice.
Also, competition from surgeons in an open system can breed dissension among
anesthesiologists, even if they are partners.204 If one anesthesiologist is receiving
considerably more consults than the others this may provoke a hostile working
environment for the physicians.
Closed staff policies have been consistently upheld by the courts. Hospitals can
institute closed staff policies, especially with provider-based physicians, and deny
physicians medical staff privileges because of them.

196

Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438, 439 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that decision to enter an
exclusive contract for anesthesia services by a public hospital had a rational basis and
therefore did not discriminate); Centeno v. Roseville Cmty. Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62 (1979)
(stating that governing body’s policy decision to enter an exclusive contract for radiology
services does not arbitrarily or unreasonably exclude otherwise qualified radiologists from
staff membership); Lewin v. Saint Joseph Hosp. of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 368 (1978)
(holding that decision of governing authority to operate chronic renal dialysis facility under
exclusive arrangement with a single group of nephrologists was substantially rational).
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Belmar, 475 A.2d at 539.
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Provider-based physicians do not have admitting privileges. They rely on physicians
who do have admitting privileges for business. Physicians request the services of the
anesthesiologist in the form of a consult. Provider-based physicians provide the service
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V. CURRENT LAW REGARDING ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
Denying a competitor physician medical staff privileges is warranted under
economic credentialing as long as the decision is made in furtherance of quality of
care.205 Federal and state law prohibits hospitals from making a privilege decision
based solely on economic factors.206 For example, a medical staff member may
desire to negatively affect a competitor’s private medical practice negatively through
the denial of hospital access. The greater number of physicians in a geographic
market with access to one or more hospitals, the more the physicians will need to
compete with each other for patients. The resulting competition might motivate
physicians on a hospital medical staff to deny privileges to competitors in an attempt
to reduce the number of doctors in the market.207 This would violate federal antitrust
laws designed to protect the public from anticompetitive and monopolistic
behavior.208
Another form of economic credentialing is prohibiting physicians from serving
on the staff if they have strong ties or loyalties to competitor hospitals.209 In Florida,
a doctor was denied membership to a hospital staff because he already was a
cardiovascular surgery director at another facility.210 In other words, his services
were declined, not because he was not qualified to practice cardiovascular surgery at
another facility but because he was viewed as an economic competitor.211
Sherry S. Bahrambeygui, a plaintiff’s attorney, says it is possible to look at
economic factors when evaluating physicians: “Economic credentialing [can be
done] if it’s a fair process where the quality of care being provided is also considered
in the mix,” she said.212 “But if you have an organization that is looking only to the
economics, and not also considering other factors that could be influencing practices
that bear on quality of care, then I do think there is a great deal of exposure there.”213
In Los Angeles, a physician was denied privileges solely on a business and
financial analysis; the physician was told “the decision is in no way a reflection of
your performance.”214 In Ohio, a court held that a hospital could consider criteria
unrelated to patient care if the criteria was rationally related to the operations of the
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208

POLLARD, supra note 5, at 8.

209

SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 82.

210

Robert Weinman, Medical Red-lining: Economic Credentials for Physicians, S.F.
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hospital and that the criteria be found in the hospital bylaws.215 Case law has shown
that courts have upheld decisions by a hospital to deny a physician staff privileges
where economic criteria was a factor.
VI. PROPOSAL: CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A
PHYSICIAN FROM BEING AMBIGUOUS TO A MORE STRUCTURED
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
As this Note has shown, a hospital can legally deny a competitor physician staff
privileges. A hospital’s reasoning must include furtherance of quality of patient care
in order to escape legal proceedings.216 A solution to this difficult situation is for the
hospital to maintain an employer/employee relationship with all of the physicians on
the medical staff.
Employment entails a written or oral contract for hire.217 The hospital-employer
would have a contract with the physician-employee. This would clarify the
uncertainty of whether a contract exists between a hospital and a physician. Under
this contract, the physician would continue to render services at the hospital as an
employee of the facility.
The key determination regarding an employer/employee relationship is the fact
that the employer can influence or control the behavior of the employee.218 The
hospital could assert its power over the physician by requiring the employee to meet
the standard of care of a reasonable physician in his particular specialty.
As an employer, the hospital would hire a physician when necessary to benefit
the public. A decision to hire the physician would also be considered from the
business aspect of the hospital. The governing body, hospital administration, and
medical staff in the form of a peer review committee, would act as a system of
checks and balances. Each would comport itself in accordance with the others.
None could make an independent decision regarding the denial of a physician’s
medical staff privileges without the other two. Therefore, the fear of one of the three
branches becoming too powerful is alleviated.
Issues such as economic
credentialing, a closed staff policy, antitrust, and exclusive contracts would then not
be litigated as frequently when a physician is not hired by the hospital. In this
manner, a hospital would be less prone to be a defendant in a suit by a physician who
was denied medical staff privileges.
The physician and hospital would enter into a contract that would include terms
such as salary, the duration of the contract, and the degree of skill that would be
required by the employee in order to be employed by the hospital. The contract
would be a legally binding entity for both employer and employee. If one party were
to breach the contract then this would be the appropriate time for the courts to
intervene.
A hospital is a business similar to any business such as a Fortune Five Hundred
Company, a franchise, or a family owned business.
Companies maintain
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employer/employee relationships and are able to become successful businesses.
There are no other businesses that engage in the unique relationship that currently
exists between a physician and a hospital. There is usually no exchange of money
that occurs between a physician and hospital,219 although the importance of each
party is apparent. Hospitals could not exist without physicians and physicians could
not adequately care for patients without the use of hospitals. The JCAHO has
defined the governing body to be the one that exerts the ultimate control and
represents ownership of the hospital.220 Today, successful business owners engage in
employer/employee relationships to manage their businesses. Hospitals should do
the same.
As this Note has shown, ambiguities exist between a hospital and a physician
regarding the authority of a hospital to deny a physician medical staff privileges. By
instituting an employer/employee relationship between a physician and a hospital
such ambiguities would decrease. By decreasing the ambiguities the number of
judicial proceedings would decrease. If legal proceeding were decreased public
policy will be served. Therefore, the concept of an employer/employee relationship
should be utilized between a physician and a hospital.
VII. CONCLUSION
A hospital has a right and a duty to review the qualifications of physicians, but
also to consider the need for and impact of additional physicians for its hospital
staff.221 The needs of the hospital must be balanced with the needs of the physician
who desires to practice at the facility. Hospitals must make decisions that are based
on the benefit of the public and must take into consideration the basis for their
existence, which is to serve the public.222
Hospitals are able to deny physicians staff privileges based on different factors.
Economic credentialing is a fair process that hospitals use when evaluating a
physician’s credentials. The hospital can use this tool along with others to deny a
physician staff privileges. It is very difficult for a physician to be successful
regarding an antitrust claim. Hospitals can deny a physician staff privileges without
a substantial fear of engaging in an antitrust violation. Closed staff policies and
exclusive contracts have been consistently upheld by the courts.
In conclusion, this Note has illustrated the complexities and ambiguities that exist
regarding how a physician and hospital are associated with each other. One
alternative that can be applied is to change the association between the two entities to
a concrete employer/employee relationship. By doing so, hospitals can make
decisions regarding denying a physician medical staff privileges without
apprehension. Serving the public and managing the business would take precedence
to court proceedings.
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